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Abstract
We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in
which players’ abilities are stochastic, but become common knowledge
before eﬀorts are expended. Players whose expected ability is lower
than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoﬀ from
participating in the contest, which may explain why they participate.
We also show that an increase in the dispersion of a player’s own abil-
ity generally beneﬁts this player. It may beneﬁt or harm his rival, but
cannot beneﬁtt h er i v a lm o r et h a ni tb e n e ﬁts himself. We also explore
the role of stochastic ability for sequential contests with the same oppo-
nent (multi-battle contests) and with varying opponents (elimination
tournaments) and show that it reduces the strong discouragement ef-
fects and hold-up problems that may otherwise emerge in such games.
High own ability dispersion selects such players into the contest and
favors them in elimination contests.
Keywords: all-pay auction, elimination tournament, contest, race,
conﬂict, multi-stage, random ability, discouragement.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: D72, D74
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many tournaments are characterized by multiple rounds, with or without the
elimination of some candidates in earlier stages of the process of determining
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1a ﬁnal winner. Internal career competition has features of an elimination
tournament in which the number of participants may shrink gradually.1
In patent races several ﬁrms may take part in what Harris and Vickers
(1987) have termed a race: a multi-battle contest in which the competitor
who ﬁrst accumulates a given number of successes wins. In the political
context, many election processes consist of multiple contest stages. In the
race for US presidency several competition stages gradually narrow down
the number of competitors.2 Many sports disciplines provide more obvious
examples.3 Also violent ﬁghting for turf, for successorship in the context
of autocratic governance systems, or for military victory in wars typically
consist of multiple battles with victory being a function of the outcomes in
these battles, and with some of the competitors being eliminated at some
stage of the process.
Contests with multiple rounds or tournaments in which the outcome of
previous battles determines whether players are allowed to enter into or win
something in later stages of the game have an important hold-up feature in
common: successful participation in the future stages of the game may re-
quire substantial eﬀort, and this may make it less attractive to expend eﬀort
in preliminary rounds of the game. Similarly, once a player has accumulated
as u ﬃciently large disadvantage in the game, he may simply want to give
up, even though success in later rounds may bring him back into play. Re-
turning to a state in which the competition becomes more balanced may not
b ew o r t hm u c he ﬀort, because the economic rents from winning the compe-
tition at this state may be dissipated by the eﬀorts expended in the state.
Wärneryd (1998), McAfee (2000), Müller and Wärneryd (2001), Klumpp
and Polborn (2006), Konrad (2004) and Konrad and Kovenock (2005, 2006)
illustrate discouragement eﬀects of this type.4
1Such competition has been analysed by Rosen (1986) and an early literature survey
is by Lazear (1995). Rosen (1986) distinguishes between heterogenous contestants with
common knowledge of all players’ talents, and an elimination tournament with two stages
in which there are diﬀerent types of players but all players share the same symmetric
priors about themselves and about all other players.
2Several dynamic aspects of the presidential nomination campaigns have been analysed
by Aldrich (1980), Strumpf (2002) and Klumpp and Polborn (2006). The latter emphasize
that outcomes of early rounds may lead to what could be called a discouragement eﬀect
for the player who lost in early rounds.
3Szymanski (2003) discusses a large set of design issues in this context. The structure
of an elimination contest has been analysed in the context of sports, e.g., by Abrevaya
(2002), Groh et al. (2003), Harbaugh and Klumpp (2005) and Horen and Riezman (1985).
4The possibility of conﬂict in future periods and its implications for the resolution of
conﬂict in earlier periods has also received considerable attention in the literature on the
economics of conﬂict (see Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas 2000, Mehlum and Moene 2004).
2In this paper we identify an important reason why the discouragement
eﬀect of future conﬂict may be less severe than current theory would imply.
A player’s ability, measured, for instance, by his or her cost of expending
eﬀort, may be random. Empirically, the existence of transitory changes in
a player’s ability is seemingly a very reasonable assumption for all of the
examples mentioned. Athletes obviously have transitory ups and down in
their ability. The same should apply to managers and workers in ﬁrms, to
researchers in laboratories and the managers who hire and supervise them,
and to politicians and their advisors in the diﬀerent stages of a campaign.
Moreover, many aspects of a player’s actual ability or eﬀectiveness in a given
battle, match, or campaign may be easily observed by an adversary, so that
it is not unreasonable to model these transitory realizations as common
knowledge at the start of the battle.
Such randomness has important implications. Shocks to the unit cost
of eﬀort ameliorate the eﬀects of cutthroat competition in single and multi-
stage perfectly discriminating contests.5 More precisely, despite the fact
that, all else equal, less able players earn a zero expected utility in such a
contest, stochastic ability means that “on any given day” an underdog may
be more able than a favorite. This turns participation in such a contest into
an option: in perfectly discriminating contests in which a player is less able
than his rival he earns a zero expected payoﬀ, but earns a positive payoﬀ,
linearly decreasing in his own cost of eﬀort, in contests in which he is more
able. Hence, players beneﬁt from mean preserving spreads of their own cost
distribution. Mean preserving spreads of a rival’s distribution of cost may
beneﬁt or harm a player, but never beneﬁt the player more than the rival
himself. All of this implies that with transient ability shocks dissipation will
be lower than in the absence of shocks and the value that players attribute
ex ante to participating in such a contest will be higher.
With transient ability, typically all players earn a positive expected pay-
oﬀ from the contest ex ante (in contrast to the deterministic cost case).
Therefore the cutthroat nature of later stage contests is moderated and
does not completely discourage eﬀort in earlier stage contests. Moreover,
the “reversion to the mean” arising in later stage contests means that even
if a player in a given contest is less able than his rival, if he is more able
on average, his continuation value from winning the contest will be greater,
and therefore his imputed value of the prize from the present contest will be
5Randomness of ability has qualitatively similar implications if the contest success
function is not perfectly discriminatory. However, we do not address this issue in this
paper.
3greater. This leads to greater eﬀort, at least partially oﬀsetting his transient
ability disadvantage. Hence, our analysis has implications for the interaction
of favorites and underdogs initiated by Dixit (1987) and further elaborated
upon by Baik and Shogren (1992) and Leininger (1993). In this line of re-
search, ability is some property that remains ﬁxed for the duration of the
contest despite any noise that might be generated by the imperfectly discrim-
inating nature of the contest success function. In contrast, we concentrate
on an environment in which players diﬀer over time in their abilities. A
player’s ability in each round of the contest is a random draw from a player
(and possibly time) speciﬁc distribution.
Our results have far reaching implications for both naturally arising and
mechanism-induced selection processes. First, we demonstrate that, given
two rival players with identical mean abilities, the player with the greater
dispersion in ability achieves higher payoﬀs in the contest against his rival.
Moreover, the “riskier” player also obtains a higher expected payoﬀ than
does his rival against any third player, regardless of that player’s distribu-
tion of ability. Hence, all else equal, we would expect evolutionary forces to
lead to greater ﬁtness of players with “riskier” distributions of abilities. Such
players would also be more willing to expend whatever entry costs might be
required to participate in perfectly discriminating contests. In addition to
this naturally occurring selection, within mechanism selection also arises.
All else equal, players with more disperse abilities have higher continuation
values from winning at early or intermediate stages of multistage contests,
which increases their cost contingent incentive to expend eﬀort in the cur-
rent stage-contest faced. This leads to both higher eﬀort and an increased
probability of advancement. Hence not only does an elimination contest
have a tendency to select individuals with higher dispersion, the dispersion
among participating individuals should increase in the later stages of an
elimination tournament.
A roadmap for the remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we
develop the formal framework and analyse the role of cost dispersion for the
payoﬀs of players in a static, perfectly discriminating contest. We consider
how these results are reinforced in a dynamic elimination contest in section
3, and in a race in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Cost dispersion and the contest
In this section we study a static contest with two players i =1 ,2.Ap r i z ei s
awarded to the winner. The value of the prize is normalized to unity. The
4competition for this prize is organized as a perfectly discriminating contest
(all-pay auction), in which the two players 1 and 2 simultaneously expend
eﬀort e1 ≥ 0 and e2 ≥ 0 and have costs of eﬀort that are equal to c1e1 ≥ 0
and c2e2 ≥ 0. Here, c1 and c2 are the per-unit-of-bid eﬀort costs of players
1 and 2,w i t hc1,c 2 ∈ [c
¯
,¯ c], and randomness of these unit cost parameters
will be our main concern. However, at the point of time when the eﬀorts are
chosen, each player knows his own and the rival player’s unit cost; hence,
at this stage, the problem describes a perfectly discriminating contest with
complete information, with payoﬀs of the players characterized as
π1(c1,e 1,c 2,e 2)=p1(e1,e 2) · 1 − c1e1 (1)
π2(c1,e 1,c 2,e 2)=p2(e1,e 2) · 1 − c2e2
where pi(e1,e 2)=1if ei >e j for i,j ∈ {1,2},a n dp1 = p2 =1 /2 if e1 = e2.
This game has been carefully analysed by Hillman and Riley (1989) and
Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996). As they show, the equilibrium of the
perfectly discriminating contest for given values of c1 and c2 is unique and
described as follows:
Proposition 1 (Hillman and Riley 1989)6 T h eu n i q u ee q u i l i b r i u mo ft h e
two-player all-pay auction with complete information is in mixed strategies.




c2e for e ∈ [0, 1
c2)





c2 + ec1 for e ∈ [0, 1
c2)
1 for e ≥ 1
c2
The payoﬀsa r e1− c1
c2 f o rp l a y e r1a n d0 f o rp l a y e r2 ,a n dw i np r o b a b i l i t i e s
are equal to 1 − c1
2c2 f o rp l a y e r1a n d c1
2c2 f o rp l a y e r2 .
We now turn to the point in time at which the players have not learned
their actual unit cost of expending eﬀort in the perfectly discriminating
contest. We assume that these costs are random variables. The main focus of
this section is how this randomness aﬀects the expected equilibrium payoﬀs
6The original characterization of equilibrium in two-player perfectly discriminating
contests assumed identical cost of eﬀort. However, as noted by Baye, Kovenock and de
Vries (1996, p. 292), behavior is invariant with respect to aﬃne transformations of utility,
so that by dividing each player’s payoﬀ by his own constant unit cost of eﬀort one can
transform a game with diﬀerent unit costs of eﬀort into one with identical unit costs of
eﬀort but transformed valuations of the prize.
5of the players at the stage when they do not yet know the realization of their
unit costs.
Assume that unit costs ci are independent random variables that are ab-
solutely continuous with ﬁnite support [c
¯
,¯ c] with ¯ c> c
¯
> 0. The cumulative
distribution functions of c1 and c2 are F1(c1) and F2(c2) with corresponding
densities f1 and f2, which we assume to be positive on [c
¯
,¯ c]. A si ss e e n
from Proposition 1, not the absolute values of c1 and c2, but rather their
ratio is of importance for the equilibrium payoﬀs. Let α ≡ c1/c2.T h e nF1
and F2 induce a cumulative distribution function Z(α),7 which we assume
is absolutely continuous with density function z(α),d e ﬁned on [α,¯ α],w h e r e
α =c
¯
/¯ c and ¯ α =¯ c/c
¯











In this perfectly discriminating contest only the player who has an actual
cost advantage receives a positive payoﬀ, and the player with the cost disad-
vantage receives a zero payoﬀ. Accordingly, if cost is dispersed, and if both
players’ cost parameters are independent random variables with the same
support, then each player has a cost advantage with positive probability,
and therefore earns a positive expected payoﬀ.
Changes in the distributions of cost parameters aﬀect the expected pay-
oﬀs. We ﬁrst study generalizations of mean-shifts and then turn to changes
in the riskiness in the sense of second order stochastic dominance.
Proposition 2 Consider two distribtions Z(α) and ˆ Z(α) with Z(α) ≥ ˆ Z(α)
for all α.T h e nπ1(Z(α)) ≥ π1( ˆ Z(α)) and π2(Z(α)) ≤ π2( ˆ Z(α)).
Proof. Integrating by parts,
Z 1
α
(1 − α)(z(α) − ˆ z(α))dα (3)
=
h










(Z(α) − ˆ Z(α))dα ≥ 0,
7Unless otherwise noted, our results stated on Z(α) will hold for more general joint
distributions F(c1,c 2) that induce the respective cumulative distribution function Z(α)
and density function z(α).
6where the last inequality uses the assumption that Z(α) − ˆ Z(α) ≥ 0 for all
α.
F o rp l a y e r2 ,l e tT(1/α) and ˆ T(1/α) be the cumulative distributions for
1/α if α is distributed according to Z(α) and ˆ Z(α), respectively. Note that
T(1/α) dominates ˆ T(1/α) in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance if
and only if Z(α) is dominated by ˆ Z(α) in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance. Moreover,
















From here, the proof for player 2 follows by integrating by parts and using
the deﬁnition of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance.
Proposition 2 considers a generalized shift in the mean of c1/c2,i nt h e
sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Intuitively speaking, if it becomes
more likely that c1/c2 is higher, then this shifts probability mass from states
with cost ratios for which the payoﬀ of player 1 is high to states with cost
ratios for which the payoﬀ of player 1 is smaller, or even zero. The expected
payoﬀ is, therefore, reduced.
We now turn to changes in the dispersion of cost. To symbolize the
property that
R x
α[ ˆ Z(α) − Z(α)]dα ≤ 0 for all x, i.e., Z is dominated by ˆ Z
in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance, we use Z ≤SSD ˆ Z .T h e
following holds:
Proposition 3 Consider two distributions Z and ˆ Z of α, such that Z ≤SSD
ˆ Z.T h e nπ1(Z) ≥ π1( ˆ Z).
Proof.
π1(Z) − π1( ˆ Z)=
Z 1
α
(1 − α)(z(α) − ˆ z(α))dα (5)
=
h










(Z(α) − ˆ Z(α))dα ≥ 0.
The second line follows from the ﬁrst line by integration by parts, and the
last inequality holds by the deﬁnition of SSD.
7Proposition 3 has implications for the ex-ante beneﬁts of uncertainty of
own strength in the perfectly discriminating contest. These implications can
be spelled out easily with the help of the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Consider three positive random variables ci, cj, and ck,w i t h
cumulative distribution functions Fi(ci), Fj(cj) and Fk(ck).L e tci and ck
and cj and ck be pairwise stochastically independent. Then, if Fi(ci) ≤SSD




The proof of Lemma 1 has been relegated to the Appendix. The Lemma
states an intuitive result. Suppose c1 is dominated by ˜ c1 in the sense of
SSD. Then, for any given c2 > 0, it holds that c1/c2 is dominated by ˜ c1/c2
in the sense of SSD. But if this holds for all c2 > 0, it should also hold for
the weighted sum over c2 of c1/c2 and ˜ c1/c2. Proposition 4 together with
Lemma 1 can be used to make the following observation.
Corollary 1 If F1(c1) ≤SSD ˆ F1(c1), then, at the stage where c1 and
c2 are not known to the players, player 1 with a cost distribution F1(c1) has
the higher expected equilibrium payoﬀ than player 1 with a cost distribution
ˆ F1(c1).
Proof. By Lemma 1, Z(α) ≤SSD ˆ Z(α) follows from F1(c1) ≤SSD ˆ F1(c1).
Hence, by Proposition 3, π1(Z) ≥ π1( ˆ Z).
Corollary 1 suggests that a player beneﬁts from a higher dispersion in his
own ability. In many other areas of economics a higher dispersion is asso-
ciated with higher risk, and generally disliked. In a contest environment, a
higher dispersion of own ability is beneﬁcial. This property may have impli-
cations for players’ decisions to enter into games which can be characterized
as all-pay auctions or contests. Players with a high variability in their ability
earn larger expected rents when entering into such games. Hence, they are
likely to be willing to expend a higher entry cost. If there are deterministic
entry fees into such games or an opportunity cost of participating, we should
therefore expect some self-selection of players: for given entry cost, players
with high variability in their ability beneﬁtm o r ef r o me n t e r i n gi n t os u c h
games and should be more likely to participate, whereas players with the
same average ability, but less variability are more likely to stay out.
Intuitively, the corollary can also be interpreted from a competition point
of view. If c1 = c2, the rules of the perfectly discriminating contest make
players compete very strongly. Competition is so strong that, as is shown
in Proposition 1, the players dissipate the full value of the prize. Dissi-
pation is less than complete if competitors diﬀer from each other, i.e., if
8their costs are not symmetric. More randomness will generally mean that,
in the actual perfectly discriminating contest, the realizations of the cost
parameters typically diﬀer. Hence, randomness will cause some diﬀerentia-
tion between players, and this will relax competition. The result parallels
results on randomness and diversity in competition theory more generally.
For instance, in both Bertrand and Cournot competition with constant unit
cost, randomness of own unit cost typically beneﬁts a ﬁrm.
The eﬀect of changes in the cost distribution of player 2 on player 1’s
payoﬀ (or vice versa) is less straightforward. Let c1 and c2 be stochas-
tically independent of each other and distributed according to F1 and F2
and let F2(c2) be a mean preserving spread of some distribution ˜ F2(c2),( s o
that
R x
c (F2(c) − ˜ F2(c))dc ≥ 0 for all x and
R ¯ c
c (F2(c) − ˜ F2(c))dc =0 ). Such a
spread does not leave the mean of α = c1
c2 unchanged and the implication of
such a spread for the payoﬀ of player 1 is not well determined.
For the most simple case in which c1 is constant, the diﬀerence in player
1’s proﬁti s :























c2( ˜ F2 − F2)dc.
The indeterminacy of the sign of this expression can be illustrated by con-
sidering two very simple distributions of c2. For this purpose, assume that
˜ F2 is degenerate, with ˜ c2 = c1
∆.M o r e o v e r ,l e t F2 be equal to ˜ F2 plus some
very simple and symmetric noise. More precisely, let c2 have two possible
outcomes in this case, c2 = 1
2
c1
∆ with probability 1/2 and c2 = 3
2
c1
∆ ,a l s o
with probability 1/2. Calculating the expected proﬁto fp l a y e r1y i e l d s
π1( ˜ F)=
½
1 − ∆ if ∆ < 1













3 ) if 1
2 ≤ ∆ ≤ 3
2
0 if ∆ > 3
2
9Accordingly, whether the mean preserving spread in c2 increases or de-
creases player 1’s payoﬀ depends here on this player’s advantage in the de-
generate case. If ∆ was larger than 1 but smaller than 3/2, then the payoﬀ
of player 1 increases from zero to something positive. If, for instance, ∆ was
between 1/2 and 3/4, the payoﬀ of player 1 actually decreases due to the
mean preserving spread in c2.
These results refer to the implications of a mean preserving spread of
the cost distribution of one player for this player and for the other player.
If two contestants’ cost parameters are identically distributed with cu-
mulative distribution functions F1(c1)=F2(c2)=F(c), symmetry implies
π1(Z)=π2(Z).W en o wc o m p a r ep a y o ﬀso ft h et w op l a y e r sw h oc o m p e t e
with each other if their cost distributions are ranked by second-order sto-
chastic dominance. We can state the following result:
Proposition 4 Let Z(α) ≤SSD ˜ Z(α).T h e n π1(Z) − π2(Z) ≥ π1( ˜ Z) −
π2( ˜ Z).
Proof. By (2),










with I{α≤1} an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if α ≤ 1 and
zero otherwise, and I{α>1} an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if
α>1 and zero otherwise. Deﬁne
Ψ(α) ≡ (1 − α)I{α≤1} +(
1
α
− 1)I{α>1}.( 8 )
This function is depicted in Figure 1. It is continuously diﬀerentiable with
Ψ0(α) < 0 and Ψ00(α) ≥ 0 for all α. Applying Theorem 2 in Hadar and
Russel (1969),




is higher for Z than for ˜ Z if Z(α) ≤SSD ˜ Z(α).8
Proposition 4 holds for distributions of α ranked by second-order sto-
chastic dominance, which may be generated by diﬀerent combinations of
8The result is obtained directly by twice integrating [π1(Z)−π2(Z)]−[π1( ˜ Z)−π2( ˜ Z)]





α (Z(x)− ˜ Z(x))dxdα−Ψ
0(¯ α)
R ¯ α
α (Z(x)− ˜ Z(x))dx and this
expression is non-negative if Ψ
0(α) ≤ 0 and Ψ
00(α) ≥ 0 by the deﬁnition of SSD.
10Figure 1: The graph of Ψ(α)
changes in F1 and F2. We are mostly interested in the implications of one
player’s cost distribution and the change in this distribution. If F1, ˜ F1 and
F2 are stochastically independent, we know from Lemma 1 that F1 ≤SSD ˜ F1
implies Z(α) ≤SSD ˜ Z(α). This yields the following result:
Corollary 2 If F1, ˜ F1 and F2 are stochastically independent and F1 ≤SSD
˜ F1 then, for the diﬀerence in expected payoﬀs, π1(F1,F 2) − π2(F1,F 2) ≥
π1( ˜ F1,F 2) − π2( ˜ F1,F 2) holds.
The corollary 2 states a seemingly natural property: as has been seen
from Corollary 1, an increase in a player’s cost dispersion directly increases
the payer’s payoﬀ. This increase in the dispersion may also increase the
other player’s payoﬀ. Corollary 2 suggests that the direct eﬀect of own cost
dispersion is stronger than the potentially positive eﬀect for the competing
player. The next corollary follows from Proposition 4 and allows us to
compare the players’ payoﬀs directly.
Corollary 3 Suppose c1 and c2 are independent and F1(c1) ≤ SSDF2(c2).
Then π1(F1,F 2) ≥ π2(F1,F 2).
Proof. If F1 = F2,t h e nπ1(F1,F 2) − π2(F1,F 2)=0by symmetry. Now
suppose F1 ≤ SSD F2. Then, by Corollary 2, π1(F1,F 2) − π2(F1,F 2) ≥
π1(F2,F 2) − π2(F2,F 2)=0 .
As a special case, Corollary 3 may be used to compare two players who
have the same expected ability, but diﬀer in their abilities by a mean pre-
serving spread (see Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970). It shows that the higher
11dispersion of ability will generally favor the player who has this higher dis-
persion. This diﬀerence in payoﬀs should also aﬀect individuals’ decisions
whether to participate in this competition. Individuals with a higher vari-
ability (in the mean-preserving spread sense) of their ability have a stronger
incentive to participate in this game.
3 Elimination tournaments
If players anticipate that the prize from winning a perfectly discriminating
contest is to enter into another perfectly discriminating contest, it may be
surprising that players expend considerable eﬀort in the semi-ﬁnal, even if
their rival in the ﬁnal is expected to be a very strong player. Particularly if
the contest is adequately described by a perfectly discriminating contest, the
fact that weaker players do not receive a rent in the equilibrium of the fu-
ture perfectly discriminating contest should strongly discourage most of the
players from entering into early rounds of a such multiple-round elimination
tournaments. Moreover, if they do enter, it should reduce their incentives
to expend eﬀort in early rounds. This discouragement eﬀect has been noted
for multi-battle contests by Harris and Vickers (1987), Klumpp and Polborn
(2006) and Konrad and Kovenock (2006), and for elimination tournaments
by Rosen (1986), Gradstein and Konrad (1999) and Groh et al. (2003).
In this section we show that ex-ante uncertainty about players’ actual
ability in any of a series of perfectly discriminating contests provides a pos-
sible explanation why players are willing to expend considerble eﬀort in
any round of a contest architecture with sequential perfectly discriminating
contests, even if they are weaker than their future opponents in terms of
expected unit cost of eﬀort. We also show that a player whose cost distri-
bution is more dispersed has a genuine advantage compared to the other
player; his expected payoﬀ is higher, and he wins with a higher probability.
We ﬁrst consider the least complex dynamic structure, which, however,
proves to be a useful building block for the analysis of more complex struc-
tures. The structure is depicted in Figure 2. There are three players,
i =1 ,2,k.I n a ﬁrst round players 1 and 2 compete against each other
in a perfectly discriminating contest, which will be called the "semi-ﬁnal".
The winner in the semi-ﬁnal will be admitted to the ﬁnal, where this winner
will compete against player k in a perfectly discriminating contest. The
timing of the game is as follows. In stage 1 players i =1 ,2 learn their own
and their opponent’s unit-cost parameters c1 and c2,w h i c h ,f o rn o w ,a r e








and F2. In stage 2 the players simultaneously choose their eﬀorts e1 and
e2,w h i c hc o s tc1e1 and c2e2, respectively. The player with the higher eﬀort
wins and enters into the ﬁnal. In the ﬁnal, the winner of the semi-ﬁnal has
to play againts player k in a perfectly discriminating contest. Player k’s
characteristics are known to players i =1 ,2, already in the semi-ﬁnal, and
are described by a cumulative distribution function Fk of player k’s cost of
eﬀort that is also stochastically independent of F1 and F2.




and the cumulative distribution functions and density functions of αij that
are induced by F1, F2 and Fk by Zij and zij, respectively. From the analysis
in section 2 we know the two players’ expected payoﬀs π1k and π2k from
entering the ﬁnal, given the characteristics of player k,a n dt h e i ro w nc h a r -




(1 − α)z1k(α)dα and π2k =
Z 1
α
(1 − α)z2k(α)dα. (11)
In the ﬁnal the winner of the semi-ﬁnal between 1 and 2 enters into a per-
fectly discriminating contest with player k, and all this is common knowledge
in the semi-ﬁnal. We can now consider the equilibrium payoﬀsf o rp l a y e r s1
and 2 in the semi-ﬁnal:
Proposition 5 Let c1 and c2 be the realization of the unit costs of eﬀort of
players 1 and 2, respectively, in the semi-ﬁnal. Then their overall equilibrium
payoﬀsw h e np l a y i n gt h es e m i - ﬁnals are
πS
12(c1,c 2)=m a x {0,π1k − c1π2k
c2 }
πS
21(c1,c 2)=m a x {0,π2k − c2π1k
c1 }.
(12)
13Proof. When players 1 and 2 compete in the perfectly discriminating con-
test in stage 1 and have cost parameters c1 and c2, they maximize
π1(e1,e 2,c 1,c 2)=prob(e1 >e 2)π1k − c1e1, and (13)
π2(e1,e 2,c 1,c 2)=prob(e2 >e 1)π2k − c2e2.
These objective functions are strategically equivalent to a situation in which
players 1 and 2 maximize
π1
π1k










respectively. For this problem, from Proposition 1, player 2 earns a payoﬀ
of zero and player 1 earns a positive payoﬀ equal to






c2 , and similarly for player 2 and player 1 switching roles if the







the two players are symmetric and dissipate all rent in expectation. If π1k
π2k >
c1
c2, then player 1 has a strictly positive expected payoﬀ that is equal to
π1k − c1
c2π2k,a n di fπ1k
π2k < c1
c2, then player 2 has a strictly positive expected
payoﬀ that is equal to π2k − c2
c1π1k .
This result can be used to state the ex-ante expected payoﬀso fp l a y e r s
1 and 2 in the semi-ﬁnal for given cost distributions. Recall that Z12(α)
is the cumulative distribution of α obtained for α = c1/c2,w i t hc1 and
c2 independent draws from distributions F1(c1) and F2(c2), respectively.
The equilibrium payoﬀs from simultaneous optimization of these objective

















W em a yn o wc o m p a r ep l a y e r s1a n d2w i t hd i ﬀerent distributions of their
unit costs, if these distributions are ordered by SSD.
14Proposition 6 If F1 ≤SSD F2,t h e nπS
1 ≥ πS
2.
Proof. Consider Z12(α;F1,F 2) the cumulative distribution of α obtained
for α = c1/c2,w i t hc1 and c2 independent draws from distributions F1(c1)
and F2(c2).L e tF1 ≤SSD F2.T h e nZ12(α;F1,F 2) ≤SSD Z12(α;F2,F 2) by
Lemma 1. We claim that under Z12(α;F1,F 2), πS
2 ≤ πS
1.
First note that π1k(F1,F k)=π2k(F2,F k) if F1 = F2 by symmetry, and
π1k(F1,F k) ≥ π2k(F2,F k) by Proposition 3 and Lemma 1 if F1 ≤SSD F2.
From (17) and (18),
πS

























































Since π2k is constant with respect to a change in F1, and it follows from
Proposition 4 that
R ¯ α
α Ψ(α)z12(α)dα is non-negative. To complete the proof,
we conﬁrm that the inequality used in (19) holds. Deﬁne s ≡ π1k
π2k,r e p l a c e














































15Accordingly, replacing all π1k
π2k > 1 by 1 will not increase the value of the
expression, and this conﬁrms the weak inequality.
Proposition 6 shows that the beneﬁts that a player receives from a more
dispersed cost distribution in the static game carry over to the dynamic
game. The beneﬁt of a higher dispersion in the structure here is two-fold.
First, the player with the more dispersed cost distribution beneﬁts from this
dispersion if he makes it to the ﬁnal and has a higher expected payoﬀ if he
is admitted to the ﬁnal. But also in the semi-ﬁnal, the higher dispersion
beneﬁts a player and increases the player’s expected payoﬀ. As the proof
shows, the two eﬀects compound.
We also consider the implications of dispersion of the cost parameter
for players’ probabilities of winning the contest. The following proposition
holds.
Proposition 7 If F1 ≤SSD F2,t h e np l a y e r1w i n st h es e m i - ﬁnal with a
(weakly) higher probability than player 2.
Proof. Since the objective functions of the competition between 1 and 2
for given c1
c2 can be stated equivalently by (14) we can apply Proposition 1













and p2(c1,c 2)=1− p1(c1,c 2).
Consider Z12(α;F1,F 2) the cumulative distribution of α obtained for
α = c1/c2,w i t hc1 and c2 independent draws from distributions from F1(c1)
and F2(c2). Integrating over all possible c1

















for a given distribution Z12(α;F1,F 2).
Let F1 ≤SSD F2.T h e nZ12(α;F1,F 2) ≤SSD Z12(α;F2,F 2) by Lemma 1.












z12(α;F2,F 2)dα =1 /2
(24)










































The win probability of player 1 is monotonically increasing in π1k
π2k and π1k
π2k ≥
1 by F1 ≤SSD F2 and Corollary 1, which is used for the inequality in line
3 of (25). To conﬁrm this monotonicity, denote s ≡ π1k











































Deﬁne the bracketed expression in the integrand in the last line of (25) to





Note that Φ(α) is continuously diﬀerentiable everywhere on (α, ¯ α) and de-
creasing in α with
∂Φ(α)
∂α = − 1
2α2 < 0 for α>1 and
∂Φ(α)
∂α = −1
2 < 0 for
α ≤ 1.F u r t h e r m o r e ,Φ(α) is convex since
∂2Φ(α)
(∂α)2 = 1
α3 > 0 for α>1 and
∂2Φ(α)








Figure 3: Elimination tournament











This concludes the proof.
These insights can now be applied to the simplest example of a self-
contained elimination tournament. Consider four players i ∈ {1,2,3,4} in
the elimination tournament that is depicted in Figure 3. The tournament
consists of a series of elimination matches. Player 1 plays against player 2
in one of the semi-ﬁnals, and players 3 and 4 play against each other in a
parallel semi-ﬁnal. The winner from each of these semi-ﬁnals is admitted to
the ﬁnal. Both the semi-ﬁnals and the ﬁnal follow the rules of a perfectly
discriminating contest similar to the perfectly discriminating contest that
was considered in section 2. Each of the respective two participants expends
eﬀort and the contestant with the higher eﬀort wins the respective stage
game, with the winner determined by a random draw in the case of a tie in
eﬀort. In each stage game the cost parameters ci of the two contestants are
independent draws (across players and time) from a probability distribution
with cumulative distribution functions Fi for i ∈ {1,2,3,4}.
We assume here that these distribution functions are time invariant; i.e.,
ci of player i in the semi-ﬁnal and in the ﬁnal are independent draws from
the same distribution Fi. Changes in the distributions over time will be
considered in section 4. For tractability, we consider the problem for players
181 and 2 assuming that players 3 and 4 have identical cost distributions
F3 = F4 ≡ Fk. For any given distribution of player i ∈ {1,2}, Fi,t h e
payoﬀ from taking part in the ﬁnal is πik(Fi,F k) a n dd e t e r m i n e db y( 2 )
with Zik(α) being the distribution of ci
ck that is induced by Fi and Fk,w h e r e
F3 = F4 = Fk makes it a matter of irrelevance for players 1 and 2 whether
3 or 4 is the other ﬁnalist.
Given this game, (17) and (18) determine the equilibrium payoﬀsi nt h e
semi-ﬁnal for players 1 and 2. We can apply Propositions 6 and 7 to conclude
that, starting at the semi-ﬁnal stage, the expected equilibrium payoﬀ and the
win probability of player 1 are higher than the payoﬀ and the win probability
of player 2 if F1 ≤SSD F2.
This example reveals that a higher cost dispersion also beneﬁts a player
in a dynamic contest. It makes it more likely that the player succeeds and is
not eliminated in an earlier round of the tournament and it also increases the
player’s payoﬀ from participating in the tournament. Thinking about selec-
tion properties of repeated elimination tournaments, this result suggests that
individuals with a higher variability in their ability have a two-fold advan-
tage in such competition structures. The prize from winning in earlier stages
is higher, and for given prize levels, the probability of winning is higher. For
the population of potential participants in such competition structures, the
self-selection of types in the entry stage and the selection forces in the course
of the elimination tournament compound in their eﬀects. Participants from
a larger population who self-select into such competition structures should
have an ability that is more dispersed than average, and this dispersion
should increase in the later stages of an elimination tournament due to the
selection properties of the elimination contest.
4 Multi-battle contests
The conclusion that dispersed ability beneﬁts players also holds for problems
in which the same players compete with each other in multi-battle contests.
Consider two players 1 and 2 in a simpliﬁed and symmetric multi-battle
contest as described Konrad and Kovenock (2006). The two players take part
in a game which is comprised of a sequence of similar one shot simultaneous
move perfectly discriminating contests which we refer to as battles. A prize
of size 1 is awarded to the one player who is the ﬁrst to win two battles; the
loser receives a prize of zero. The problem is depicted in Figure 4. Starting
from the initial state (2,2) the ﬁrst battle takes place. If player 1 wins,






Figure 4: Multi-battle contest
subsequent battle. If player 2 wins the subsequent battle, they move to state
(1,1). Similarly, if player 2 wins the battle at (2,2), they enter into state
(2,1). From there, 2 can win the prize in the next battle, or, if 1 wins at
(2,1),t h e ym o v et o(1,1). Finally, the subgame at state (1,1) is equivalent
with the static perfectly discriminating contest that was studied in section
2.
Konrad and Kovenock (2006) consider a more general version of this
game with asymmetric players, with more than two required battle wins,
and with intermediate prizes that are allocated to the winner of any bat-
tle. However, they assume that the ability of players is exogenous, invariant
across all states, and known to both players. Applying their framework to
the simple symmetric case, they show that the symmetric game has the fol-
lowing interesting features: at (2,2),t h es u mo fb o t hp l a y e r s ’e ﬀorts is equal
to the unit value of the prize. From there, players move to state (2,1) or
(1,2). At this asymmetric state the advantaged player wins without expend-
ing any further eﬀort and the perfectly discriminating contest at (2,1) or
(1,2) becomes trivial. The key for understanding this result is the following
fact. Suppose the players are in state (2,1).P l a y e r 1 could expend some
positive eﬀort and try to win the perfectly discriminating contest in this
state. But if he does this and wins, the players will enter into state (1,1),a t
which they will dissipate all rent ﬁghting over the unit prize in a symmetric
perfectly discriminating contest with complete information. It is this antic-
ipated outcome that leads to hold-up and prevents player 1 from trying to
get back into play and to win, once the contest becomes asymmetric.
We consider how ability uncertainty at each state changes the result.









2 (c2) ≡ F(i,j) in states (i,j) and (j,i), in the sense that
the actual cost parameters c
(i,j)
k at state (i,j) are draws from F(i,j),a n d
stochastically independent over players and time. Further, let Z(i,j)(α) be
the distribution of c1
c2 that is induced by these distribution functions. We
solve the multi-battle contest recursively, starting with state (1,1).
At (1,1), a perfectly discriminating contest takes place. The expected









2 = π(1,1) a n da r eg i v e ni n( 2 ) .T u r nn o wt o(1,2).P l a y e r1’s
payoﬀ from winning at (1,2) is equal to 1 (the unit prize), and 1’s payoﬀ
from losing is determined by the payoﬀ in the continuation game at (1,1),
i.e., equal to π(1,1).F o rp l a y e r2, the payoﬀ from losing at (1,2) is zero. The
payoﬀ from winning is the equilibrium payoﬀ in the continuation game at
(1,1),i . e . ,e q u a lt oπ(1,1).
From Proposition 1, for given c1 and c2, it holds that the equilibrium
payoﬀ f o rp l a y e r1i s1− c1
c2π(1,1) for c1
c2 < 1−π(1,1)
π(1,1) and π(1,1) for c1
c2 ≥ 1−π(1,1)
π(1,1) .












Analogous reasoning for player 2 yields an equilibrium payoﬀ equal to π(1,1)−
c2
c1(1 − π(1,1)) for given cost parameters with c1
c2 > 1−π(1,1)
π(1,1) ,a n dap a y o ﬀ of
zero for c1
c2 ≤ 1−π(1,1)
π(1,1) . Hence, the expected equilibrium payoﬀ at (1,2) prior










(1 − π(1,1)))z(1,2)(α)dα. (30)









Turn now to state (2,2).P l a y e r 1’s gain from winning the perfectly









symmetry, the same applies for player 2. This diﬀerence can be calculated


























is convex in α for a given value of π(1,1). Accordingly, making again use of
(2), but using that the value of winning is not equal to 1, but equal to (31),








2 )(1 − α)]z(2,2)(α)dα + π
(2,1)
1 . (33)
This payoﬀ is typically strictly positive. Of course, the payoﬀ is bounded





Consider also changes in the distribution of Z(i,j)(α) in the sense of SSD.
If Z(2,2) ≤SSD ˆ Z(2,2),t h e nb yP r o p o s i t i o n3p l a y e r1 ’ sp a y o ﬀ is higher under
Z(2,2) than under ˆ Z(2,2). Similarly, if Z(1,1) ≤SSD ˆ Z(1,1),t h e nπ(1,1) under
Z(1,1) is higher than π(1,1) under ˆ Z(1,1).A l s o , π
(1,2)
1 is convex in α, and,
hence, a mean preserving spread in Z(1,2)(α) will increase π
(1,2)
1 .
It is conceptually straightforward and notationally cumbersome to gen-
eralize this outcome for multi-battle contests that do not start at (2,2),
but at some state (n,m). But it is clear from this example that uncer-
tainty about actual ability in each single battle will partially resolve the
hold-up problem in this game. Players will not dissipate the value of the
prize if they start in a symmetric state (n,n) in which they have symmetric,
but random abilities. Also, in contrast to the case of deterministic ability
(Konrad and Kovenock 2006), eﬀort will generally not drop to zero in the
perfectly discriminating contest in asymmetric states. Intuitively, starting
in an asymmetric state, returning to a state of symmetry will not imply that
all rent will be dissipated in expectation at this state, and this provides in-
centives for the disadvantaged player to try and catch up to the advantaged
player.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we show that transient ability shocks or, more precisely, shocks
t ot h eu n i tc o s to fe ﬀort, ameliorate the eﬀects of cutthroat competition
in single and multi-stage perfectly discriminating contests. More precisely,
despite the fact that, all else equal, less able players earn a zero expected
utility in such a contest, stochastic ability means that “on any given day” an
22underdog may be more able than a favorite. This turns participation in such
a contest into an option: a player earns a zero expected payoﬀ in perfectly
discriminatory contests in which he is less able than his rival, but earns a
positive payoﬀ,l i n e a r l yd e c r e a s i n gi nh i so w nu n i tc o s to fe ﬀort, in contests
in which he is more able. Hence, players beneﬁt from mean preserving
spreads of their own cost distribution. Mean preserving spreads of a rival’s
distribution of cost may beneﬁt or harm a player, but never beneﬁtt h e
player more than the rival himself. This has important implications for
the hold-up problem arising in multi-stage contests. First, because players
earn a positive expected payoﬀ from the contest ex ante (in contrast to the
deterministic cost case), the cutthroat nature of later stage contests does not
completely discourage eﬀort in earlier stage contests. Second, the “reversion
to the mean” arising in later stage contests means that even if a player in
a given contest is less able than his rival, if he is more able on average, his
continuation value from winning the contest will be greater, and therefore
his imputed value of the prize from the present contest will be greater.
This leads to greater eﬀort, at least partially oﬀsetting his transient ability
disadvantage.
Our results have far reaching implications for both naturally arising and
mechanism-induced selection processes. First, we demonstrate that, given
two rival players with identical mean abilities, the player with the greater
dispersion in ability achieves higher payoﬀs in the contest against his rival.
Moreover, the “riskier” player also obtains a higher expected payoﬀ than
does his rival against any third player, regardless of that player’s distribu-
tion of ability. Hence, all else equal, we would expect evolutionary forces to
lead to greater ﬁtness of players with “riskier” distributions of abilities. Such
players would also be more willing to expend whatever entry costs might be
required to participate in perfectly discriminating contests. In addition to
this naturally occurring selection, within mechanism selection also arises.
All else equal, players with more disperse abilities have, higher continuation
values from winning at early or intermediate stages of multistage contests,
which increases their cost contingent incentive to expend eﬀort in the cur-
rent stage-contest faced. This leads to both higher eﬀort and an increased
probability of advancement.
6 Appendix
In this Appendix we formally prove Lemma 1 for absolutely continuous
distributions. The proof for more general distributions is similar. Deﬁne
23αs = cs
ck for s ∈ {i,j}, and let Zs(αs) be the cumulative distribution function




















































where γ ≡ αck.N o w , s i n c e cj dominates ci in the sense of second-order
stochastic dominance,
hR ckx
c (Fi(γ) − Fj(γ))dγ
i
≥ 0 for all xck ≥ 0,a n d
this, in turn, implies that the last line in (34) is non-negative for all x and
this completes the proof.
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